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Abstract: This paper examines whether policy intervention around elections affects income inequality 
and actual fiscal redistribution. We first develop a simplified theoretical framework which allows us to 
examine fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town” and there 
is a threat of revolution from some groups of agents. Subsequently, employing data for a panel of 65 
developed and developing countries during the period of 1975-2010, we provide robust empirical 
evidence of electoral cycles on income inequality and actual fiscal redistribution in countries 
characterized as new democracies. Moreover, our analysis suggests that this effect is mainly driven by a 
political instability channel which induces incumbents to redistribute resources - through fiscal policy - 
towards the poorer segments of the society in order to convince them that “democracy works”. In 
contrast, inequality and actual fiscal redistribution are not affected by elections in countries characterized 
as established democracies.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies on Political Budget Cycles (PBC) suggest that, around the election date, 
incumbents manipulate policy instruments in order to increase the chances of re-election.
1
 A 
strand of this literature places the spotlight on factors conditioning the occurrence and the 
strength of fiscal policy manipulation for electoral purposes (for a literature review on 
conditional PBCs, see Klomp and de Haan, 2013a). Starting from Schuknecht (1996), the 
relevant literature suggests that fiscal manipulation is more likely in developing countries where 
the institutional checks and balances are weaker, allowing for greater political discretion over 
policy instruments.
2
 Shi and Svensson (2006) provide evidence of fiscal expansions around 
elections in both developing and developed countries, although they show that the effect is far 
stronger in developing countries, where information asymmetries between voters and politicians 
are more pronounced. Brender and Drazen (2005), on the other hand, argue that PBCs are not 
driven by differences in the level of development between countries but instead by differences in 
the age of the political regime. More precisely, they suggest that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation 
is stronger in countries characterized as new democracies because of the voters’ lack of 
familiarity with the electoral process.
3
 Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 8) argue that 
there is a strong political revenue cycle in developed economies, but the overall budget balance 
remains unaffected.  
Another strand of the literature investigates how pre-electoral manipulation affects the 
composition rather than the level of fiscal policy. More precisely, Schuknecht (2000) provides 
empirical evidence of pre-electoral manipulation at the national level – in 24 developing 
countries – through increases in public investment rather than public consumption. Similar 
empirical findings are provided by studies conducted at the local level, which suggest that 
around elections authorities expand the level of investment spending (see, e.g., Khemani, 2004; 
Drazen and Eslava, 2010). The theoretical argument behind these empirical findings is that 
                                                 
1 The opportunistic approach was firstly formulated in the traditional model of “political business cycles” of Nordhaus (1975). In 
contrast, the partisan approach deals with the behavior of ideologically motivated politicians (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977). 
2 Streb eat al. (2009) support this argument by showing that in non-OECD countries the budget balance falls significantly more in 
election years in comparison to what occurs in OECD countries. 
3 More recently, Klomp and de Haan (2013b) provided evidence that the occurrence of a PBC is much stronger in developing 
counties and “young democracies” as opposed to industrial countries and old democracies. However, Efthyvoulou (2012), based 
on a sample of 27 European Union members for which fiscal policy is the only remaining instrument that incumbents can use, 
provides evidence in favour of a systematic electoral cycle in the level of fiscal policy. It is worth noting, though, that when 
Klomp and de Haan (2013c) employ a semi-pooled panel model to allow the impact of elections to vary across countries, they 
find no PBC in most countries.  
 
3 
capital spending for investment projects can be easily targeted to particular geographical 
constituencies and therefore is able to increase very effectively the political support received by 
the incumbent (see, e.g., Drazen and Eslava, 2010).  In contrast, Block (2002) and Vergne (2009) 
provide empirical evidence that, around elections, politicians in developing countries shift the 
composition of spending towards current expenditure and away from capital expenditure. Similar 
findings are also obtained by Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) for a sample of OECD countries, 
where policymakers seem to provide immediate benefit to voters through cuts in direct taxation, 
whereas capital spending decreases. The theoretical justification of these empirical results dates 
back to Rogoff’s (1990) argument that electorally motivated incumbents signal their competence 
by shifting public policy toward more visible fiscal items and away from capital expenditure that 
becomes visible in future periods.
4
  
This paper contributes to the relevant literature in two ways. First, it seeks to investigate 
the implications of pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policy on income inequality.  As already 
mentioned, previous empirical studies have verified that pre-electoral periods exert significant 
impact on the size and the composition of government spending (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 
2005; Vergne, 2009) as well as on the size and the composition of tax revenues (see, e.g., 
Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012). These changes on fiscal policy are 
expected to have vital distributional implications which, to the best of our knowledge, have not 
been examined by the relevant literature. To this end, we employ data from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), developed by Solt (2009), which allow us to 
investigate the effect of PBC on (i) market income inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient before taxes 
and transfers), on (ii) net income inequality (i.e., Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers), as 
well as on (iii) actual fiscal redistribution (i.e., the percentage change of Gini indices before and 
after transfers and taxes).  
Second, our analysis extends the theoretical model of Aidt and Mooney (2014) in order to 
develop a simple theoretical framework in which elections take place “in the shadow of 
revolution”. This allows us to investigate the distributional implications of the political budget 
cycles in countries characterized as old democracies (where elections is the one and only 
common acceptable political rule) and those characterized as new democracies. More precisely, 
                                                 
4 We note that manipulation of the composition of fiscal policy seems particularly relevant in developed economies, in which the 
incumbent may avoid deficit creation due to the fear of voters’ disfavour (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2008). 
4 
when the democratic regime is not fully consolidated, incumbent politicians face a potential 
threat of revolution from specific groups of agents especially during pre-electoral periods (see, 
e.g., Fearon, 2011; Little, 2012; Little et al., 2014).
5
 In the latter case, incumbent politicians 
decide on pre-electoral fiscal policy by taking into account the probability of a democratic 
regime’s collapse in addition to their own reelection probability.6 Uncertainty concerning the 
type of the political regime alters in a very fundamental way the pre-electoral optimal strategy of 
the incumbent and consequently affects the impact of elections on the implemented fiscal policy. 
More precisely, our theoretical model suggests that in new democracies, fiscal policy also serves 
as a device for consolidating democracy, and it does not solely affect the reelection probability of 
the incumbent. Thus, in new democracies, pre-electoral fiscal redistribution allocates resources 
to a broader group of agents (which also include low-income agents) instead of being strictly 
targeted to the middle income citizens, in which the “pivotal” group of voters is located, in the 
established ones.
7
  
Our empirical analysis builds on a dataset of 65 developed and developing countries over 
the period of 1975-2010. Our main results can be summarized as follows:  first, our analysis fails 
to provide evidence in favour of an electoral cycle on (i) market income inequality, (ii) net 
income inequality, and (iii) actual fiscal redistribution for countries characterized as established 
democracies, regardless of whether they are developed or developing countries. In contrast, our 
analysis provides robust empirical evidence that, in countries characterized as new democracies, 
elections exert a positive and highly significant impact on actual fiscal redistribution. Moreover, 
our findings suggest that the effect of elections is stronger in new democracies characterized by 
relatively higher political instability. This is in accordance with the implications driven from our 
theoretical framework, which suggests that, in vulnerable democratic regimes, incumbent 
                                                 
5 It is frequently argued in the literature that only antidemocratic elites (e.g., military groups, oligarchs etc.) can pose a serious 
threat in the newly established democracy (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Nonetheless, empirical and anecdotal evidence 
strongly suggest that the support of the citizenry towards democracy cannot be taken for granted (see Linz and Stepan, 1996). For 
instance, a few years after the democratization in Brazil, according to the Brazilian national survey published at February 1992, 
the poorest citizens were the least supportive of Democracy. 
6 The tension that surrounds the pre-electoral campaigns in a newly established regime is another important factor that contributes 
significantly to the political instability. In many cases it has been observed that periods around elections are the periods of highest 
vulnerability for the democracy (e.g., Bolivia, 1978-80; Nigeria, 1993; Pakistan 1977 etc.). Brender and Drazen (2007) provide 
empirical evidence that, in “young democracies”, the regime is almost three times more likely to collapse in election years than in 
non-election years.  
7 Obviously, our theoretical results are in line with those obtained by Brender and Drazen (2005). However in our model 
differences on the political budget cycles between new and old democracies are driven by the potential threat of revolution and 
not from lack of familiarity of the electorate with the democratic electoral process as suggested by them. 
 
 
5 
politicians allocate resources – through fiscal policy – towards the poorer segments of society in 
order to convince them that “democracy works” and therefore to mitigate the risk of a potential 
revolution. Our empirical findings are also in line with previous studies examining the impact of 
the political regime’s age on political budget cycles (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2005; 2009, 
Klomp and de Haan, 2013d). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework and formalizes the testable implications of the theoretical model. Section 3 describes 
the data and demonstrates the empirical setup. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes the main points. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
This section elaborates on the theoretical link between elections and fiscal redistribution so as to 
formalize the testable empirical implications driven by the relevant theoretical literature. 
Building on the theoretical model of Lohmann (1998) and Aidt and Mooney (2014), we develop 
a simplified theoretical framework which allows us to investigate fiscal redistribution around 
elections when democracy is not “the only game in town” and consequently elections may take 
place “in the shadow of revolution” from some groups of agents. 
 We consider an economy populated by three types of individuals: the rich (R) of size δR, 
the middle income (M) of size δM, and the poor (P) of size δP, in which we assume that δM > 
δR+δP and δR +δM+δP=1. The rich have a fixed income yR, the middle income group a fixed 
income yM, and the poor a fixed income yP where yR>yM>yP during two periods t=1,2. Tax rate (τ) 
is proportional on the income of each group, and it is fixed at a level of   in both periods. The 
elected national government in each period collects tax revenues and runs a balanced 
government budget by deciding whether to use the given tax revenues in order to finance a lump-
sum targeted transfer ( P
tT ) that is directed to the low income group of agents or a lump-sum 
transfer ( M
tT ) that is directed to the middle income group or a lump-sum transfer (
R
tT ) that is 
directed to the rich group of the individuals. Finally, the government decides whether to extract 
resources from public funds by diverting tax revenues to private income (
tr ) for itself.  The 
government budget constraint is P M R
P t M t R t tT T T r y       , where y  is the average income. 
An election takes place between the two periods.   
6 
 Citizens’ well-being depends on three factors: (i) the budget allocation, (ii) the quality of 
the politician running the government, and (iii) random events (luck). The utility generated by 
the budget allocation and private consumption is 
 
(1 )P Pt P tu y T             (1) 
 
(1 )M Mt M tu y T            
(2) 
 
(1 )R Rt R tu y T            
(3) 
 
Quality of governance matters for the citizens, because the utility they get from a given 
budget allocation increases with the quality of the incumbent politician. The total utility of the 
agents is  
 
(1 )P Pt P t t tU y T q               (4) 
 
(1 )M Mt M t t tU y T q              
(5) 
 
(1 )R Rt R t t tU y T q              
(6) 
 
where tq is a quality shock, which determines how competent the incumbent is, and t  is a 
“luck” shock that makes him look more or less competent than may be the case. The 
fundamental information assumption of the model is that the voters observe total utility, but they 
are unable to decompose this between: lump-sum transfers, quality shock ( tq ) and “luck” shock 
( t ).
8
 Although the two shocks are unobserved, they are both drawn from known distributions. 
The luck shock ( t ) is drawn independently in each period and is equal to -1/2 (resp. 1/2) with 
                                                 
8 The underlying assumption is that voters are ill-informed about the finer details of public finance. This is analogous to the 
assumption in Lohmann (1998) that voters do not observe in direct way the implemented monetary policy.  
7 
the probability 1/ 2P   (resp. 1/ 2P  ).
9
 The quality shock ( tq ) is a characteristic of the 
politician and follows a uniform distribution over 
1 1
,
2 2
 
 
 
. If the politician is getting reelected, 
the quality shock from period 1 also applies to period 2, whereas if a new politician is elected in 
period 2, a new quality shock is drawn from the above mentioned known uniform distribution.  
 The total utility of the incumbent is increasing and quasi-concave. For algebraic 
simplicity, we use an additively separable function of the form: 
 
1 2ln( ) ln( )IW r p E r           
(7) 
 
where 0 1   is a discount factor and Ip  is the probability that the incumbent is 
reelected. The quantity tr  denotes rents grabbed in period t=1,2, and E denotes the exogenous 
rents from winning the elections.
10
  
 We solve the model under two alternative political regimes. The first one (that will serve 
as benchmark) is an established democratic regime in which democracy is “the only game in 
town”. In this case, citizens vote the politician which is, according to their view, the most 
competent, and then all agents accept the electoral outcome as the sole common political rule. In 
such a context, the incumbent politician has the incentive to strictly focus on the welfare of the 
middle income group trying to engineer a pre-election increase in its utility, since the latter 
makes him appear more competent and consequently increases his probability of reelection. In 
this case, our results are similar to those obtained by the relevant theoretical literature (see, e.g., 
Aidt and Mooney, 2014; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Lohmann, 1998). The second political regime 
is a new democracy in which “elections take place in the shadow of revolution”. In this case, the 
incumbent faces a potential threat of revolution from some groups of agents, and the previously 
described strategy of focusing exclusively on the welfare of the middle income citizens fails to 
ensure that he will remain in office. In such a case, politicians also must take into account the 
probability of survival of the democratic regime per se (except of their own reelection 
probability) in order to stay in power. Since the fragility of the democratic regime is related to 
                                                 
9 That is the luck shock (μt) follows a Bernoulli distribution with P(-1/2)=P(1/2)=1/2  
10 These exogenous ego-rents (E) reflect the value attached to winning the elections and holding office (see Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000 ch.3.2 for more details on this). 
8 
the welfare of groups other than the pivotal voter, the optimal strategy for the incumbent is to 
focus on the welfare of a broader group of agents. 
 
2.1 Fiscal redistribution when democracy is “the only game in town”. 
First, consider the benchmark case of an established democracy. The timing of the events in this 
case is as follows: (1) At the beginning of period 1, a balanced budget  1 1 1 1, , ,P M RT T T r  is 
implemented. (2) The two random shocks 1q  and 1  are realized. Random shocks are not 
observed directly by anyone, but all agents are able to observe total utility. (3) At the end of the 
first period, elections take place, and the voters either re-elect the incumbent politician or elect a 
new politician. (4) The winner implements a balanced budget  1 1 1 1, , ,P M RT T T r  for period 2.  (5) A 
new luck shock 2 is realized. If the incumbent of the first period is reelected, the quality shock 
from period 1 (i.e. 1q ) carries over to period 2; otherwise, a new quality shock 2q is realized. (6) 
Finally, total utility is determined and observed by all agents.  
Solving the model with backwards induction, we see that, in period 2, the politician has 
no incentive to behave well. Therefore, he appropriates the maximum amount of rents 
*
2r y , 
implying zero targeted transfers to all alternative groups of agents 
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T   . 
Equations (4)-(6) imply that voters are clearly better off with a more competent (high q) 
politician, as this gives them higher period 2 utility. Thus, they use elections as a mean to 
reappoint competent politicians and oust incompetent ones, taking into account their observed 
utility in period 1 and knowing that the opponents’ expected quality at the elections is    
( ) 0E q  .11 We now describe how this takes place and how it shapes politicians’ incentives in 
period 1.  
 
2.1.1. The optimal voting behavior and the utility targets.  
In order to describe how the politicians’ decisions in period 1 affect the probability of re-
election, we need to describe optimal voting behavior.  
In period 2, since 
*
2r y  and
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T   , the welfare of agents in the three groups is as 
follows: 
                                                 
11 This is because the quality shock of the opponent is drawn from a uniform distribution which is known to the voters.  
9 
2 2 2(1 )
P
PU y q              (8) 
 
2 2 2(1 )
M
MU y q             
(9) 
 
2 2 2(1 )
R
RU y q             
(10) 
 
where 
2 1 2(1 )I Iq p q p q
     since, if the incumbent of the first period is getting reelected, the 
quality shock from period 1 ( 1q ) carries over to period 2, whereas if a new politician is elected, a 
new quality shock ( 2q ) is realized. Since all politicians implement the same post-election budget, 
the only reason voters care about who gets reelected is that quality varies.  
As seen from period 1, the expected quality of the politician elected in period 2 is  
 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1(1 ) ( )I I IE q p E q p E E q p E q
           (11) 
 
This is because the expected quality of a new politician is zero on average 1 2 2 2 2( ) 0E E q E q  . 
Thus, the voters want to re-elect the incumbent if and only if their estimate of his quality at the 
end of the period 1 is positive; that is, if and only if 1 1 0E q  . Since in our model δM > δR+δP , the 
pivotal group of voters is the group of the middle class (M). Thus, we further proceed by 
focusing on the preferences of this specific group of agents on the actions of the politician.  
More precisely, to form a Bayesian estimate of the expected quality of the incumbent, 
middle income voters use information on the observed utility of the first period 1
MU  and their 
knowledge about the equilibrium budget strategy of the incumbent. The equilibrium budget 
strategy of the incumbent is 
1 1(1 )
M M
Mu y T   . Subtracting the equilibrium budget strategy ( 1
Mu
) from equation (5), we get:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M M M MU u T T q q       
       
(12) 
 
10 
we get the last equality by making use of the fact that, at equilibrium, 1 1
M MT T .  Equation (12) 
shows that, by using their knowledge of the equilibrium, voters can infer the sum of the two 
shocks (but they are unable to decompose between these two and therefore to infer the quality of 
the politician). A rational voter can solve the resulting signal extraction problem and estimate 
that:  
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 12 2
1
( ) ( )
4
q M M M M
q
E q U u U u


 
   

      (13) 
 
Based on equation (13), we conclude that the incumbent politician will be reelected if the 
realized utility of the middle income agents exceeds the budget-related utility that the voters are 
expecting from the incumbent to deliver in equilibrium, that is, if and only if 1 1 0
M MU u  . 
Using equation (12) we can restate this criterion as 1 1 1 1
M Mq T T   .  
 
Having assumed that 1 follows a Bernoulli distribution with P(-1/2)=P(1/2)=1/2 and that 1q
follows a uniform distribution over 
1 1
,
2 2
 
 
 
 , we get that summation 1q + 1  follows a uniform 
distribution over 1,1 .  
 
Consequently, we get the following probability of reelection as perceived by the incumbent: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) [1 ( )]
2
M M M M
Ip P q T T T T            (14) 
 
Equation (14) shows that reelection probability is increasing in fiscal transfers directed to the 
middle class. Therefore, incumbent has an incentive to decide the allocation of tax revenues such 
as to increase fiscal redistribution towards this specific group of individuals.  
  
 
 
11 
2.1.2. The budget allocation in equilibrium 
Combining equations (7) and (14) with the government budget constraint, we conclude that the 
equilibrium values for  1 1 1 1, , ,P M RT T T r  are those that maximize incumbent’s inter-temporal utility: 
 
1 1 1 2
1
ln( ) [1 ( )] ln( )
2
M MW r T T E r
 
     
        
(15) 
 
subject to the government budget constraint in the first period
1 1 1 1
P M R
P M RT T T r y        
and 
the rent extraction decision of the second period (i.e. 
*
2r y ). Then, Appendix 1 shows: 
 
Proposition 1. The incumbent generates a rational political budget cycle. The after election 
result is 
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T  
 
and *
2r y . The pre-election result is 
* *
1 1
M
Mr y T    
(which is 
lower than *
2r  for 
*
1 0
MT  ) and 
*
* 2
1 *
2
ln( ) 2
ln( )
M M
M
y E r
T
E r
  
 
 


 (which is positive if 
*
2ln( ) 2 My E r    ).  Finally, 
* *
1 1 0
P RT T  . 
 
Thus, during the pre-electoral period the incumbent may reduce extracted rents and 
correspondingly increase the fiscal transfers to the middle income group in order to convince the 
voters of his quality and therefore to remain in office for a second period.  
 
However, since pre-electoral fiscal transfers are directed exclusively to the middle income group 
and not to the low income group of agents, elections fail to reduce after-tax-and-transfers income 
inequality and consequently the actual fiscal redistribution.  
 
Corollary 1.  Since pre-electoral fiscal transfers are strictly targeted to the middle income group 
they do not reduce after-tax-and-transfers Gini coefficient and therefore they do not affect actual 
fiscal redistribution.  
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2.2 Fiscal redistribution when “elections take place in the shadow of revolution”. 
In this section, we solve the model for the case of a new-established democracy. More precisely, 
we assume that, in the first years after democratic consolidation, democracy is not “the only 
game in town”, and citizens have an option to revolt against the incumbent if the latter fails to 
ensure a minimum amount of competence. Therefore, in this case, the democratic regime is not 
taken as given, and there is a probability of the democratic regime’s collapse and consequently a 
reversal to other forms of governance.  
 The timing of the events in this case is as follows: (1) At the beginning of period 1, a 
balanced budget  1 1 1 1, , ,P M RT T T r  is implemented. (2) The two random shocks 1q  and 1  are 
realized. Random shocks are not observed directly by anyone, but all agents are able to observe 
total utility. (3) At the end of the first period, elections take place, and the voters either re-elect 
the incumbent politician or elect a new politician. (4) After elections, the citizens decide whether 
to revolt or not. More precisely, if the incumbent politician fails to convince the citizens that his 
quality exceeds a minimum amount of competence, a revolution takes place and the democratic 
regime collapses with probability Rp . (5) In period 2, regardless of whether the democratic 
regime survived or not [in stage 4], the official implements a balanced budget  2 2 2 2, , ,P M RT T T r  (6) 
A new luck shock 2 is realized. If the democratic regime was survived and the incumbent of the 
first period was reelected, the quality shock from period 1 (i.e. 1q ) carries over to period 2; 
otherwise, a new quality shock 2q is realized. (7) Finally, total utility is determined and observed 
by all agents.  
Again solving the model with backwards induction, we see that, in period 2, the official 
(whether democratically elected or not) has no incentive to behave well. Therefore, he extracts 
the maximum amount of rents 
*
2r y , implying zero targeted transfers to all alternative groups 
of agents 
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T   . As in Section 2.1, equations (4)-(6) imply that citizens are clearly 
better off with a more competent (high q) politician, as this gives them higher period 2 utility. 
Thus, they use elections as a mean to reappoint a competent politician and throw out of office the 
incompetent ones. However, in the case of a new democracy, the citizens have one additional 
option in order to ensure a minimum amount of competence (i.e. quality that equals to q ) – to 
13 
revolt against the incumbent and to oust him from office. Now we describe how this takes place 
and how it shapes politicians’ incentives in period 1.  
 
2.2.1. The optimal voting behavior and the utility targets.  
Since δM >δR+δP when elections take place, the pivotal group of voters remains the middle 
income group (M). Following the rationale developed in Section 2.1.1, the criterion of the middle 
class to vote for the incumbent is 1 1 0
M MU u   , which concludes the following probability of 
reelection as perceived by the incumbent: 1 1
1
[1 ( )]
2
M M
Ip T T   . Thus, reelection probability in 
a newly established democracy is identical to that characterized by the established ones. More 
precisely, the probability of reelection is increasing in the fiscal transfers ( 1
MT ) directed to the 
middle class. 
 
2.2.2. The threat of revolution. 
Following the rationale of the relevant theoretical literature, we assume that in new- established 
democracies elections also act as a public signal of government’s popularity which helps the 
citizens to solve potential problems of collective actions and to revolt against the incumbent 
whenever there is verified a high level of anti-regime sentiments (see, e.g., Fearon, 2011; Little, 
2012; Little et al., 2014). Therefore, we assume that at the end of the first period -after elections 
take place- the citizens from the middle income (M) and the low income (P) groups decide 
whether to revolt or not.
12
 More precisely, citizens revolt whenever their estimate of the 
incumbent quality at the end of the first period is negative and below a threshold quality level q . 
That is, if and only if 1 1 0E q q  . This condition is binding only in the case of the low income 
citizens. This is because middle income citizens determine the probability of reelection through 
their vote and therefore they demand an even higher (i.e., a positive) competence at the end of 
the first period in order to vote for the incumbent.
13
 Thus, we focus on the low-income group of 
                                                 
12 In summarizing the experience of the new democracies of Southern Europe Linz and Stepan (1996) suggest that consolidation 
of democracy occurs only when ordinary citizens come to believe that democracy is superior to any other form of governance to 
address the problems society faces. Similarly, Brender and Drazen (20007) suggest that in the first years after a democratic 
transitions ordinary citizen have to be convinced about the superiority of democratic governance and their pro-democratic 
feelings cannot be taken for granted.  
13 As in Section 2.1 middle class citizens vote for the incumbent if only their estimate of the incumbent quality at the end of the 
first period is positive (i.e. if E1q1>0) 
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agents and examine how the threat of potential revolution shapes a politician’s incentives in 
period 1.  
 Low-income citizens revolt against the incumbent if and only if their estimate of his 
quality at the end of the period 1 is negative and below a threshold quality level q , 1 1 0E q q  . 
As in Section 2.1.1, in order to form a Bayesian estimate of the expected quality, citizens rely on 
the observed utility of the first period 1
PU and their knowledge about the equilibrium budget 
strategy of the incumbent. The equilibrium budget strategy of the incumbent is 
1 1(1 )
P P
Mu y T   . Subtracting equilibrium budget strategy ( 1
Pu ) from equation (4) we get:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P P P PU u T T q q       
       
(16) 
 
Equation (16) shows that using their knowledge of the equilibrium, citizens can infer the sum of 
the two shocks (but they are unable to decompose between these two and therefore to infer the 
quality of the politician). A rational citizen can solve the resulting signal extraction problem and 
estimate that:  
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 12 2
1
( ) ( )
4
q P P P P
q
E q U u U u


 
   

      (17) 
 
 Based on equation (17), we conclude that low-income citizens will decide to revolt if 
1 1
1
( )
4
P PU u q  . Using equation (16), we can restate this criterion as: 1 1 1 1 4
P Pq T T q    , 
where 1q + 1  follows a uniform distribution over 1,1 .  
 
Consequently, we get the following probability of revolution as perceived by the incumbent: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( 4 ) [1 ( ) 4 ]
2
P P P P
Rp P q T T q T T q             (18) 
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Assuming that whenever a revolution takes place it is successful and the democratic regime 
collapses, we conclude to the following probability of democratic regime survival: 
 
1 1
1
1 [1 ( ) 4 ]
2
P P
D Rp p T T q             (19) 
 
Equation (19) shows that the probability of democratic regime’s survival is increasing in fiscal 
transfers directed to the low-income group of individuals ( 1
PT ). Thus, when “elections take place 
in the shadow of revolution”, the incumbent faces an incentive to increase fiscal redistribution 
towards the poorer agents, since in this way stabilizes the political regime and consequently 
increases the probability to remain in office. In other words, in a relatively new democracy, 
focusing solely on the preferences of the middle income group it is not sufficient condition to 
remain in office, since in this case the incumbent also faces a potential threat of revolution from 
the low-income group that may lead to a political regime switch. Therefore, the total utility of the 
incumbent in the case a new democracy takes the following form: 
 
1 2ln( ) ln( )D IW r p p E r           
(20) 
 
where Ip  is the probability of the incumbent to be reelected and Dp  is the probability of the 
democratic regime to survive.  
 
2.2.3. The budget allocation in equilibrium 
Combining equations (20), (14), and (19) with the government budget constraint, we conclude 
that the equilibrium values for  1 1 1 1, , ,P M RT T T r  are those that maximize the incumbent inter-
temporal utility in the case of a new established democracy: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
ln( ) [1 ( ) 4 ] [1 ( )] ln( )
2 2
P P M MW r T T q T T E r
   
          
       
(21) 
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subject to the government budget constraint in the first period, 
1 1 1 1
P M R
P M RT T T r y        
and 
the rent extraction decision of the second period (i.e. 
*
2r y ). Equation (21) shows that, in the 
case of a new established democracy, it is also the fiscal transfers to the low-income group of 
agents ( 1
PT ) that affect the probability of the incumbent to remain in office. This is because fiscal 
transfers directed to the low-income group of agents ( 1
PT ) serve as a policy instrument of 
democratic consolidation, whereas fiscal transfers directed to the middle income group ( 1
MT ) is a 
policy instrument that affects re-election probability when elections take place. Then, Appendix 
1 shows: 
 
Proposition 2. The incumbent generates a rational political budget cycle. After election result is
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T  
 
and *
2r y . The pre-election result is 
* *
1 1 *
2
1 4
ln( )
P MM
P P
T y T
E r


  
  

 
(which is positive for *
1 *
2
41
ln( )
M P
M M
T y
E r


  
 

)
 
and * *
1 1 *
2
1 4
(1 4 ) ln( )
M PP
M M
T y T
q E r


  
  
 
 
(which is positive for *
1 *
2
41
(1 4 ) ln( )
P M
P P
T y
q E r


  
 
 
). Finally,  * * *
1 1 1
P M
P Mr y T T     (which 
is lower than  *
2r y  for any positive 
* *
1 1,
P MT T ) 
 
Thus, during the pre-electoral period the incumbent may reduce extracted rents and 
correspondingly increase fiscal transfers directed to the middle and to the low income group of 
citizens in order to convince the voters of his quality and therefore to remain in office for a 
second period.  
 
Corollary 2.  Every combination of 
*
1
MT and 
*
1
PT  that ensures 
*
1 0
PT   directs an amount of total 
transfers to the low-income group of agents and therefore reduces after-tax-and-transfers Gini 
coefficient. 
 
Therefore, in the case of new established democracies, pre-electoral transfers to the low-income 
group of agents can be optimal solution for the incumbent. In this case, elections exert a negative 
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impact on after-tax-and-transfers income inequality and a positive impact on actual fiscal 
redistribution.  
 
3. Econometric analysis 
In this section, we primarily examine the effect of elections on income inequality and actual 
fiscal redistribution. Then, we investigate whether this relationship differ between old and new 
established democracies.  
 
3.1 Data set and variables  
Following previous studies, we measure income inequality using the Gini coefficient index. This 
index ranges from a minimum value of zero, indicating that all individuals have the same 
income, to a theoretical maximum of one, at which all incomes are concentrated in one person. A 
primary concern within the research on inequality is data comparability, both over time and 
across countries. Our preferred data are obtained by the SWIID, developed by Frederick Solt 
(Solt, 2009). The SWIID maximizes the comparability of income inequality statistics for the 
largest possible sample of countries and years, namely for 174 countries for as many years as 
possible from1960 to 2010. For the construction of the dataset, Solt (2009) employed a custom 
missing-data algorithm to standardize Gini estimates from all major existing resources of 
inequality data (e.g., Luxembourg Income Study, World Income Inequality database etc). An 
important advantage of the SWIID is that it maximizes the comparability of income inequality 
statistics for the largest possible sample of countries and years. The SWIID includes Gini 
estimates for gross income (before taxes and transfers) as well as net income (after taxes and 
transfers) denoted as gini_market and gini_net, respectively. Furthermore, the percentage change 
between gini_market and gini_net gives us an estimate of fiscal redistribution
14
: 
 
it
itit
it
Ginitaxpre
GinitaxpostGinitaxpre
redist

                                 
(22)
 
 
An additional advantage of the SWIID is that potential pre-electoral effects on income 
distribution can help us to draw inferences regarding the implemented fiscal policy around 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, if we use the difference between market-income and net-income Gini-indices results remain essentially the same. 
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elections. For instance, pre-electoral policies based on targeted transfers to low-income groups 
potentially can affect gini_net and redist, while public projects that promote public employment, 
if targeted to low-income groups, can affect gini_market. Moreover, the SWIID provides 
estimates of uncertainty for each observation of the income inequality and redistribution 
measures. Closely related to this point, Solt (2009) notes that inequality data included in the 
SWIID are often thin in the early years that a country enters in the dataset. For this reason, 
although data for gini_market and gini_net are available for more years, observations for the 
variable redist are restricted after 1975 for most of the advanced countries and only after 1985 
for most countries in the developing world. Taken this into account, we also restrict the 
observations for the variables gini_market and gini_net for which the variable redist is 
available.
15
  
It should be stressed that the Political Cycles models assume competitive elections. 
Therefore, in our sample, we include only those countries for which the variable POLITY2 from 
the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) receives positive values, and at the same time, 
the variables Liec and Eiec from the Database on Political Institutions (DPI), provided by the 
World Bank (Keefer, 2012), receive values equal or higher than 6.
16
 Following the majority of 
the empirical literature, we measure electoral uncertainty by constructing an election dummy 
(elec) that receives the value of one in an election year and zero otherwise. It is worth noting that 
we restrict our attention to legislative elections for countries with parliamentary political systems 
and presidential elections for countries with presidential systems. Election dates were collected 
from the DPI and complemented, when needed, with information from various sources (e.g., the 
African Elections Database).  
In turn, we consider in our empirical analysis a number of explanatory control variables 
that we expect to affect income inequality and redistribution. More precisely, we include in the 
set of explanatory variables GDP per capita (gdppc) and its squared term (gdppc^2), obtained 
from Penn World Tables, to test for the hump-shaped relation between economic development 
and inequality, as described by Kuznets (1955). Moreover, from the same database we obtain an 
index of human capital per person (human capital), based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting that, in Section 4.2.3, we conduct a battery of robustness checks in order to limit further the uncertainty that 
is related to the Gini estimates and be more confident about the precision of our results.   
16 A value of 6 indicates that multiple parties did win seats, but the largest party can receive more than 75% of the seats. 
However, our sample and results remain essentially the same if we restrict variables Liec and Eiec to receive a value of 7, which 
indicates multiparty elections and that the largest party got less than 75% of the seats.  
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2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). We expect an increase in the human 
capital index to be negatively related to income inequality (see, e.g., Li et al., 1998). In addition, 
in our analysis we include a number of demographic variables obtained from World Bank's 
World Development Indicators (WDI). More precisely, we employ the dependency ratio of the 
population (dependency) that is measured as the percentage of the population younger than 15 
years or older than 64 to the number of people of working age between 15 and 64 years. This 
variable allows us to control for demographic influences on the structure of social spending and 
fiscal redistribution (see, e.g., Galasso and Profeta, 2004; von Weizsacker, R., 1996). The next 
control is population density (population density), defined as the population divided by land area 
in square kilometres. A larger share of population density ensures economies of scale in the 
provision of the public good and therefore higher fiscal redistribution for a given level of 
spending (see, e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). Yet, the model includes the inflation rate 
(inflation), because low-income households are likely to be relatively more vulnerable to price 
increases than others (see, e.g., Albanesi, 2007). Furthermore, we use the KOF Index of 
Economic Globalisation (global), developed by Dreher (2006), to test the potential effects of 
economic globalisation on fiscal redistribution and income inequality (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1997; 
1998).
17
 
 
3.2. Empirical Specification  
 
To test the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2, we use the following specification to 
analyze the impact of elections on income inequality and fiscal redistribution:  
 
ittiitititit elecaYaY    110                                                                (23) 
where Yit stands for the dependent variables that are of interest for income inequality 
(gini_market and gini_net) and fiscal redistribution (redist) in country i and year t; elec is the 
indicator we use to capture the influence of elections; Z is the vector of country-specific socio-
economic control variables that we expect to affect income inequality and redistribution; μi and λt 
are unobserved country and time-specific effects, respectively; and εit is the error term.  
                                                 
17 We have also attempted to include in our model a series of other control variables, such as population size, population growth, 
foreign aid, voter turnout, variables on political constraints, and others. However, none of these variables had a significant effect 
on income inequality/redistribution, and due to other concerns as well (correlation of control variables, reduction of sample size), 
we do not include them in our estimations. Results are available upon request. 
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To check for differences between new and established democracies, based on the 
approach of Brender and Drazen (2005), we consider the first four elections after a shift to a 
democratic regime, indicated by the first year of a string of uninterrupted positive POLITY 
values, as elections held in a new democracy. Thus, we separate the binary indicator elec into 
variables elec_old and elec_new for elections in old/established democracies and in new 
democracies, respectively. To this end, we modify equation (23) in the following way:   
 
ittiititit newelecoldelecYY    __ 2110                         (24) 
 
In our case, among the 362 elections in the sample, 109 elections were held in new 
democracies. We expect elec_new to exert a negative impact on income inequality after tax and 
transfers (gini_net) and a positive impact on actual fiscal redistribution (redist). This occurs 
because in new democracies incumbent politicians take into account the probability of a 
democratic regime’s collapse in addition to their own re-election probability. Therefore, they 
allocate resources to a broader group of agents (which also include low-income agents), in 
comparison to what happens in an established democracy where pre-electoral policies are strictly 
targeted to the middle class in which the “pivotal” group of voters is located. 
Another interesting issue concerning this literature is the timing of elections. As argued 
by Heckelman and Berument (1998), the timing of elections may not be exogenous to 
government policy but is chosen strategically by the incumbent when economic conditions are 
favourable, raising issues of a reverse causation in our specification. On the other hand, early 
elections may be also called due to a deterioration of economic conditions that may create a 
majority for replacing the government. In order to address the issue of potential endogeneity of 
electoral procedures, we follow the approach of Brender and Drazen (2005) to distinguish pre-
determined elections. More precisely, we look at the constitutionally determined election interval 
and take as predetermined those elections that are held during the expected year of the 
constitutionally fixed term. Hence, we split the electoral indicator elec_new into elec_new_pred 
(resp. elec_new_endog) for the predetermined (resp. endogenous) elections held in new 
democracies, and elec_old into elec_old_pred (resp. elec_old_endog) for predetermined (resp. 
endogenous) elections in old democracies. Hence, we modify equation (24) in the following 
way:   
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endognewelec
prednewelecendogoldelecpredoldelecYY



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4
32110
       (25)       
 
In our case, among the 109 (253) elections held in new democracies (old democracies) in 
the sample, 87 (177) elections are classified as predetermined. Our unbalanced cross-country 
time series dataset includes observations for 65 countries over the period of 1975-2010 (see 
Appendix 2).
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 A complete list of all variables used in our estimations is provided in the Data 
Appendix. 
In all specifications, in line with many previous studies, we include the lagged dependent 
variable Yit-1 on the right-hand side of our estimated equation, since income inequality may 
exhibit a great deal of persistence for which one must control (see, e.g., Chong et al., 2009; 
Amendola et al., 2013). A problem that arises from this specification, though, is that regressions 
produce extremely high autoregressive coefficients. Hence, before estimating equations (23)-
(25), we need to test for the existence of unit roots in our data, because if the dependent variable 
is not stationary, we are faced with spurious relationships when that variable is entered on the 
right-hand side of the equation. Here we rely on the Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) 
tests, which are non-parametric Fisher-type tests that combine the p-values of standard 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for each country. Both tests assume that all series 
are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the 
panel is stationary. As can be seen in Table 1, when a constant and a trend are included, we have 
clear indications that the variables gini_market and gini_net are non-stationary, while the results 
are mixed for variable redist. When we apply the same panel unit root tests to the first-
differenced data, the results indicate that we can reject the null of a unit-root in all cases (i.e., 
inclusion of trend and intercept, or just trend).  
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
                                                 
18 The sample size was restricted by the availability of income inequality data as well as the competitiveness of elections for 
those countries and years for which income inequality data are available. Moreover, it is worth noting, that when we restrict the 
sample to those countries that we have more than 10 observations results (available upon request) remain unaffected.  
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A common approach for dealing with non-stationary data is to take first differences in 
order to proceed with a dynamic specification in differences (see, e.g., Mechtel and Potrafke, 
2013). Hence, we end up modifying equations (23)-(25) in the following way: 
 
ittitititit elecaYaY    110                                                                    (26) 
ittititit elecnewelecoldYY    2110                                         (27) 
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where we first difference our dependent variable and the covariates of our model − all measured 
initially in levels − with the exception of the electoral dummy variables. This implies that we put 
more structure in the data for the identification of the electoral effects. It is worth noting, though, 
that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a potential bias by not satisfying the 
strict exogeneity assumption of the error term εit. One solution could probably be the application 
of dynamic panels (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The problem that 
arises is that these estimators yield consistent estimates in small T large N panels. In our case, 
we have 65 countries, and when we split our sample between developed and developing 
countries, these numbers decrease to 22 and 43 countries, respectively. Still, as it is analyzed in 
the literature, the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the time length of 
the panel, even as the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Nickell, 1981). The 
average time series length of our panel is around 22, 29 and 18 for the whole sample, the 
developed and developing countries, respectively, making the bias probably negligible. It is 
worth noting that by taking first differences we eliminate time-invariant country effects, but not 
time-fixed effects. Hence, we proceed using a dynamic OLS model with time-fixed effects.
19
 
Moreover, we control for regional fixed effects through dummies identifying countries in the 
East-Asian Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Middle-East and North 
Africa, North America and Western Europe, the Pacific and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In the next section in which we check the robustness of our results, splitting even further 
                                                 
19 The F-test results presented in our tables indicate that time-fixed effects are in general significant, and therefore they are 
included in the regressions. The qualitative results in all regressions do not significantly change when we exclude year effects.  
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our sample and reducing the average time series length to below 12, we implement also the bias-
corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Baseline Results 
Our baseline results are reported in Table 2. Regarding the lagged dependent variable, our results 
reveal positive and statistically significant coefficients, in the strong majority of our estimates, 
suggesting that income inequality displays a great deal of persistence. Moreover, we get some 
weak evidence that GDP per capita is positively related to Δredist (Δgini_market) in the group of 
developed (developing) countries. Furthermore, the squared term of GDP per capita, namely 
Δgdppc^2, has a negative, though not robust, effect on Δredist (Δgini_market) in the case of 
developed (developing) countries. Interestingly enough, the human capital indicator (Δhc) has a 
statistically significant effect only when regressed against net income inequality in Table 8, 
while we find no effect of the age dependency (Δdependency) on income inequality and fiscal 
redistribution.
20
 On the other hand, the coefficient of variable Δpopulation_density, when the 
OLS model is applied, is positive when significantly related to market inequality and fiscal 
redistribution. Next, as expected, the variable Δinflation is positively and significantly related to 
net inequality in the general specification of Table 2. This result, though, does not seem to be 
robust on the one hand, and on the other hand, when we split our sample between developed and 
developing countries, it seems to be driven by the case of developing countries. Finally, the 
variable Δglobal has a positive (negative), though not robust, effect on net income inequality 
(fiscal redistribution) in developed countries. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
Regarding the effect of elections, in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2, where we estimate equation 
(26), our results indicate that the variable elec is negative and significantly related to the variable 
Δgini_net at the 10% level. Hence, we get some weak evidence that, near elections, net income 
inequality decreases. Moving one step forward, in columns (4)-(6), where we estimate equation 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that the qualitative results remain essentially the same after dropping these two variables from our 
regressions. 
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(27), we separate the binary indicator elec into variables elec_new and elec_old, for elections 
held in new and old democracies, respectively. As expected, in column (5) of Table 2 our results 
show that the variable elec_new is negatively related to net income inequality at the 1% level. 
Given that in column (4) the coefficient of variable elec_new is statistically insignificant when 
related to Δgini_market, we have a clear indication that, in new democracies, incumbents 
intervene pre-electorally to redistribute income to low-income groups.
21
 Indeed, in column (6), 
the coefficient of elec_new is positively related to Δredist at the 5% level, which implies that, in 
new democracies, office-motivated incumbents engage in pre-electoral manipulation to 
redistribute income to the poorer members of the society.
22
 Next, in columns (7)-(9), where we 
estimate equation (28), we proceed to a four-way split of our electoral indicator to distinguish 
between pre-determined and endogenous elections that were held either in new or in old 
democracies. The significant coefficient of the variable elec_new_pred suggests that only in new 
democracies and during predetermined electoral campaigns held during the expected year of the 
constitutionally fixed term, incumbents adopt policies that generate fiscal redistribution.
23
   
Next, in Table 3 we re-estimate equation (28), as in columns (7)-(9) of Table 2, after 
splitting the sample between developed and developing countries. We separate the sample 
because, according to the literature, apart from the age of democracy, the level of development 
can be a crucial determinant for the pre-electoral intensity of fiscal manipulation (see, e.g., Streb 
and Torrens, 2013; Klomp and de Haan, 2013b). More specifically, in developing countries, 
checks and balances can be weaker and informational asymmetries regarding the competence 
level of the incumbent (a crucial assumption of PBC models) is more pronounced, making the 
adoption of intense pre-electoral policies more likely. In the case of developed countries, it has 
been argued that the electorate can monitor more easily the elected officials and punish those 
                                                 
21 Moreover, pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policy, and its distributional implications, may depend significantly on the 
nature of the constitutional rules. As outlined by the relevant literature, politicians in proportional and parliamentary democracies 
are more prone to promote broad-based policies, such as welfare spending, whereas in majoritarian and presidential ones, this 
holds for geographically targeted expenditures (see, e.g., Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Hence, 
electoral cycles may differ between proportional and majoritarian systems or presidential and parliamentary governments. It is 
worth noting, though, that when we split our electoral indicator to account for these differences, the results (available upon 
request) suggest that the constitutional rules matter, but only for new democracies where the electoral cycle exists to begin with. 
22 Moreover, to check whether government ideology and its effect on fiscal policy priorities (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Potrafke, 
2011) affects our results, we have interacted the electoral dummy variables in new and old democracies with a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for left wing governments and 0 otherwise. Our results (available upon request) do not indicate that fiscal 
redistribution in “young democracies” is conditional on government ideology.  
23 As already mentioned, following the approach of Brender and Drazen (2005), we consider the first four elections after a shift to 
a democratic regime, as elections held in a new democracy. Alternatively, if we reduce the number to three the effect of elections 
on fiscal redistribution remains essentially the same, while as expected the effect becomes weaker when we increase the number 
of elections held in a new democracy to five.  
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who engage in pre-electoral manipulation (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2008). On the other 
hand, it is true that incumbents in developed countries have a greater variety of policy 
instruments on their disposal. This availability gives them the opportunity to disguise a possible 
pre-electoral intervention on the one hand, in order to avoid the punishment of the electorate; on 
the other hand, it makes highly likely an impact on income inequality and/or redistribution 
measures.  
As can be seen in columns (4)-(6) of Table 3 our results are driven by the experience of 
less-developed countries. More precisely, in column (6), for predetermined elections in new 
democracies, we observe an increase in the change of fiscal redistribution by 0.87. Given that the 
mean value of Δredist in the sample is 0.034 points (with a standard deviation of 1.7 points), it is 
clear that this effect is quantitatively sizable. Our empirical findings are in line with our theoretical 
predictions as well as with previous studies examining similar issues (see, e.g., Brender and 
Drazen, 2005; 2009). More precisely, our analysis suggests that, in relatively vulnerable 
democratic regimes, incumbent politicians allocate resources – through fiscal policy – towards 
the poorer segments of the society, whereas in the case of well-established democracies, our 
analysis fails to verify any significant impact of elections on fiscal redistribution. The positive 
impact of elections on fiscal redistribution can be explained by taking into account that, in new 
democracies, elections take place “in the shadow of revolution” from ordinary citizens, and 
therefore, fiscal policy also serves as a device of consolidating democracy. Our findings are also 
in accordance with Brender and Drazen (2008; 2009), who suggest that in new democracies pre-
electoral shifts in fiscal policy do not serve to improve re-election prospects. Instead, the same 
authors provide evidence that, in young democracies, the regime is almost three times more 
likely to collapse in election years than in non-election years. They conclude that incumbent 
politicians provide benefits mostly because they seek to provide a signal that “democracy works” 
and therefore seek to prevent a reversion to autocracy. 
 
[Table 3, here] 
 
On the other hand, in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3, results for developed countries deviate 
significantly from what we get for developing countries. More precisely, although we get a 
negative effect of elec_new_pred on market inequality (Δgini_market), which contributes to the 
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significant reduction of net inequality, fiscal redistribution does not seem to be affected pre-
electorally. It is worth noting, though, that we cannot make strong inferences about this result, 
because we have only 8 electoral observations for this variable. However, this result may 
indicate that the level of development of the public sector in developed countries allows them to 
intervene pre-electorally using a variety of different policy instruments. In particular, 
government intervention may not come solely from transfers, but also from public projects that 
can potentially decrease market inequality (see, e.g., Alesina et al. (2000)).  
 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we inquire into the robustness of the analytical results obtained in Table 3, by re-
estimating the regressions under various modifications. First, we re-run regressions after splitting 
our sample between new and old democracies, instead of dividing the dummy variable as in 
Tables 2 and 3. Second, we repeat regressions of Table 3 using an alternative electoral indicator 
that allows us to control for differences in election dates across as well as within countries. 
Finally, we repeat regressions to ensure that the results of Table 3 are not influenced by outlier 
observations. 
 
 
4.2.1. Alternative Specification 
As a first step in the sensitivity analysis, instead of dividing the electoral dummy variable 
between new and old democracies, we proceed to split our sample. More precisely, in columns 
(1)-(3) of Table 4, we restrict our sample only to those observations that a country is considered 
an old democracy. Next, for those observations that countries are considered as old democracies 
we split the sample between developed and developing countries, in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9), 
respectively. Moreover, in columns (10)-(12) we keep only those observations according to 
which a country is considered a new democracy, while in columns (13)-(15) we keep in our 
sample only new democracies in developing countries.
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 It is worth noting that in all 
specifications of Table 4 we divide the electoral dummy variable between predetermined 
(elec_pred) and endogenous elections (elec_end) to account for the potential endogeneity of the 
electoral process. As already discussed in Section 3.2, the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side of the equation introduces a potential bias of order 1/T, where T is 
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to perform regressions for new democracies in developed economies.  
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the time length of the panel (see, among others, Nickell, 1981). The average time series length of 
our panel until now was above 18, and the bias is probably negligible. However, in this section in 
which the average length of the panel decreases in some cases below 12, we opt for using the 
LSDVc estimator as proposed by Kiviet (1995) and extended by Bruno (2005) to unbalanced 
panels.
25
   
 
[Table 4, here] 
 
Our results in Table 4 seem to verify those obtained in Table 3. More precisely, as can be seen in 
columns (1)-(9) of Table 4, in old democracies, and regardless of whether they are developed or 
developing counties, income inequality and fiscal redistribution are not affected during electoral 
campaigns. More importantly, in columns (10)-(15) of Table 4 results verify that only in new 
democracies and during predetermined electoral campaigns, incumbents adopt policies that 
generate fiscal redistribution.  
 
4.2.2. Weighted electoral indicator 
Until now, in order to capture the effect of elections, we followed the majority of the relevant 
literature, and we included in our regressions an election dummy (elec) that receives the value of 
one in an election year and zero otherwise. It is important to note that this indicator is not 
affected by the specific timing of elections. This might be problematic, because if elections take 
place early in the year, then the dummy variable may be capturing primarily post-electoral 
effects. One way to deal with this issue is to construct a pre-election indicator (preel) that takes 
the value of x/12, with x denoting the month the election is held, in order to directly control for 
differences in election dates across as well as within countries (see, e.g., Franzese, 2000). In 
order to reproduce regressions in Table 3, we proceed into a four-way split of the variable preel. 
More precisely, we split the indicator preel into preel_new_pred (preel_new_end) and 
preel_old_pred (preel_old_end), for predetermined (endogenous) elections in new and old 
democracies, respectively. 
                                                 
25 We use the Arellano-Bond (1991) as the first step estimator, whereas we undertake 200 repetitions of the procedure to 
bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The qualitative results, though, remain unaffected when we apply the Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982) or the Blundell and Bond (1998) models as first-step estimators or even when we apply more repetitions to estimate 
the standard errors.  
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[Table 5, here] 
 
Regarding the effect of elections on inequality and redistribution, the qualitative results 
presented in Table 5 remain essentially the same as those depicted in Table 3. More precisely, 
our previous finding that fiscal redistribution (Δredist) increases only during predetermined 
elections held in new democracies continues to hold.  
 
4.2.3. Testing for outliers 
As a final step, we perform three checks to ensure that the results presented in Table 3 are not 
influenced by outlier observations. First, to control for the effect of individual outliers, we use 
Cook's distance that measures the effect of deleting a given observation based on each 
observation's residual in the regression and its leverage in the estimation process. Hence, 
according to the rule of thumb, we re-estimate regressions without observations with a Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n (where n the number of observations). As can be seen, Cook’s distance 
identified 32 to 40 outlier observations in the various specifications. In Table 6, we re-estimate 
our regressions after dropping the identified outlier observations, and the statistical significance 
of the main variables of interest remains unaffected. Moreover, as expected, the R-squared of the 
estimated equations has significantly improved by the exclusion of the outliers.  
 
[Table 6, here] 
 
Second, as already mentioned, the SWIID maximizes the comparability of available 
income inequality data, but incomparability remains, and it is reflected in the standard errors 
reported in the SWIID for each observation of variables gini_market, gini_net, and redist. The 
provision of standard errors is an additional advantage of the SWIID, because it allows us to take 
into account the largest part of the remaining uncertainty of inequality data estimates. Hence, in 
Table 7, in order to increase further the reliability of our results, we choose to exclude from 
regressions 10% of the observations that variables gini_market, gini_net, and redist are 
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associated with the higher standard errors.
26
 The results that are reported in Tables 7 confirm our 
previous finding about the positive impact of elections held in new democracies on fiscal 
redistribution.  
 
[Table 7, here] 
 
Finally, in Table 8 we estimate our preferred specifications excluding the ex-Soviet Union 
countries. Given the profound restructuring of these countries’ societies and economies during 
the period of democratisation, which probably differs from other democratizations observed in 
our sample, we attempt to assess the importance of this group of countries for our results. Hence, 
in columns (1)-(3) of Table 8, we choose to exclude the ex-Soviet Union countries from the full 
sample of 65 countries as well as from the group of developing countries in columns (4)-(6). As 
can be seen in Table 8, our results for the effect of elections on fiscal redistribution do not seem 
to be driven by the experience of the ex-Soviet Union countries. 
 
[Table 8, here] 
 
 
4.3. Regime’s stability and fiscal redistribution around elections 
So far, our results indicate that the age of the regime is a crucial determinant for the shape of 
fiscal policy around elections. More specifically, during the first four elections of a newly 
established democratic regime, fiscal manipulation seems to generate fiscal redistribution. On the 
other hand, pre-electoral manipulation after the consolidation of the democratic regime does not 
seem to have any distributional implications. It seems that the vulnerability of the democratic 
regime in the first years after the transition is directly related to this result. In this section, we 
attempt to provide additional evidence that the vulnerability of the regime, which so far has been 
measured by the age of the democracy, is of paramount importance for the observed pro-poor 
pre-electoral policies.  
                                                 
26 Additionally, if we drop from our sample the three Sub-Saharan Africa countries, where the precision of the estimates for the 
Gini-indices and fiscal redistribution measures may not be that accurate, our results (available upon request) remain unaffected. 
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Ideally, in our analysis, we would prefer to use measures for the public attitudes towards 
democracy based on the World Value Survey (see Inglehart et al., 2004). Unfortunately for the 
most relevant questions of this survey for our research (e.g., having a democratic political 
system), we have only 3 observations per country from 1994 onwards. As an alternative, we use 
measures of state violence that are provided at the Social, Political, and Economic Event 
Database (SPEED), collected by Nardulli et al. (2011) at the University of Illinois. The database 
includes daily observations for a range of variables (e.g., coups, anti-regime protests), which we 
collapse into simple counts per country year. From the alternatives provided, we choose the 
variables state repression and state violence as the two most relevant for our purpose. Hence, the 
variables state repression and state violence are introduced in equation (28), on at the time, on 
their own and in interaction with the four-way split electoral variables.  
Hence, in Table 9, where the dependent variable is Δredist, we intend to provide additional 
evidence of the effect of regime’s stability on the relationship between the elections and fiscal 
redistribution. In columns (1) and (4), we use the whole sample of countries, while in columns 
(2), (5) and (3), (6), we use the groups of developed and developing countries, respectively.  
 
 [Table 9, here] 
 
The results obtained are very interesting. As can be seen, the variable Δstate repression is 
insignificantly related to fiscal redistribution in all estimates, while Δstate violence is negatively 
related to fiscal redistribution in the specification for the whole groups of countries in column 
(4). Moreover, when we split the sample between developed and developing countries, none of 
the electoral variables, or the interacted terms, are statistically significant for the case of 
developed countries in columns (2) and (5). Nonetheless, for developing countries, when the 
variables state repression and state violence are interacted with the electoral indicators, evidence 
is supportive for the effect of pre-electoral instability on the shape of fiscal policy. More 
specifically, in column (3), although we find no evidence of fiscal redistribution around 
endogenous elections in new democracies, when the variable elec_new_end is interacted with 
state repression, the effect becomes positive and statistically significant. Interestingly enough, 
for the same group of countries, it seems that political instability around elections is an important 
determinant of fiscal redistribution, not only in new but also in old democracies. In particular, in 
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column (6) interaction terms elec_new_pred*Δstate violence and elec_old_pred*Δstate violence 
are positive and statistically significant related to variable Δredist. Hence, as expected, in the first 
years after the transition to the democratic regime, when the elected officials face turbulence 
around elections, they shift their fiscal policy towards poorer segments of the society in order to 
signal that “democracy works” and stabilize the regime. The fact that we get an identical result 
for old democracies in developing countries might prove that the path to consolidation in many 
cases is not completed after the end of the first years of the democratic transition.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether policy intervention around elections affects income inequality and 
actual fiscal redistribution. Building on the theoretical model of Aidt and Mooney (2014), we 
develop a simplified theoretical framework which allows us to examine fiscal redistribution 
around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town” and consequently there is a 
threat of revolution from some groups of agents. Our analysis suggests that, in relatively new 
democratic regimes, where fiscal policy also serves as a device of consolidating democracy, 
incumbent politicians allocate resources to a broader group of agents (which include low-income 
agents) during the pre-electoral periods. Therefore, in new democracies, elections exert a 
positive impact on fiscal redistribution. In contrast, in relatively stable democratic regimes, fiscal 
transfers are strictly targeted to the middle class, in which the “pivotal” group of voters is 
located. In this case, pre-electoral increased transfers are solely directed to the middle class and 
not to the lower income group of agents, and therefore, elections do not affect actual fiscal 
redistribution. 
In the empirical part, we employ data for a panel of 65 developed and developing 
countries during the period of 1975-2010 in order to investigate the validity of our theoretical 
predictions. Our findings indicate that in countries characterized as young democracies, elections 
exert a positive and highly significant impact on actual fiscal redistribution. Moreover, our 
analysis provides evidence that the effect of elections is stronger in young democracies 
characterized by relatively higher political instability. In contrast, we fail to provide evidence in 
favour of an electoral cycle on: (i) market income inequality, (ii) net income inequality, and (iii) 
actual fiscal redistribution for countries characterized as established democracies, regardless of 
whether they are developed or developing countries. 
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Backed by strong empirical results, we contend that fiscal redistribution acts as a mean of 
consolidating a democratic regime in the first years after the political transition. The effect of 
redistribution policies on economic incentives and consequently on economic growth remains 
always a highly controversial issue. However, placing the spotlight on the political dimension of 
fiscal redistribution, allows us to explain why this kind of policies is implemented so extensively 
and by so many different incumbents in new democracies. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Proposition 1. The incumbent generates a rational political budget cycle. The after election 
result is 
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T  
 
and *
2r y . The pre-election result is 
* *
1 1 2
M
Mr y T r   
*
* 2
1 *
2
ln( ) 2
ln( )
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M
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  
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 


 and * *
1 1 0
P RT T  . 
 
Proof. 
In period 2, the incumbent has no incentive to behave well. Therefore, he extracts the maximum 
amount of rents 
*
2r y , implying zero targeted transfers to all alternative groups of agents
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T   . 
 
In period 1, the incumbent decides optimally 1
PT , 1
MT , 1
RT and 
1r  by maximizing equation (15) 
subject to the government budget constraint in the first period (i.e.
 1 1 1 1
P M R
P M RT T T r y       ) 
and the rent extraction decision of the second period (i.e. 
*
2r y ). According to equation (15) 
1
PT and 1
RT  imply solely the costs from the point of view of the incumbent. Therefore, in the 
absence of any cost benefit trade off, optimal decision is * *
1 1 0
P RT T  .  
 
Concerning the decision of 1
MT we take the first order derivative of (15) with respect to 1
MT  and 
we have: 
*
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1
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
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*
* 2
1 *
2
ln( ) 2
ln( )
M M
M
y E r
T
E r
  
 
 
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Obviously, 
*
1
MT is strictly positive if and only if 2ln( ) 2 My E r    . 
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Finally, from the first period government budget constraint we take * *
1 1
M
Mr y T    which is less 
than 
*
2r y  for positive values of 
*
1
MT . 
 
 
Corollary 1.  Since pre-electoral fiscal transfers are strictly targeted to the middle income group 
they do not reduce after-tax-and-transfers Gini coefficient and therefore they do not affect actual 
fiscal redistribution.  
 
Proof. 
By definition, the after-taxes-and-transfers Gini coefficient in period 1 (i.e. before the elections) 
equals: 
 
1 ,1 ,1( ) ( )p R R M R P P MG s s            
 
where δP, δM and δR denote the proportions of the three groups agents and sR,1 and sP,1 denotes the 
after taxes and transfers income shares of the rich and the poor in the first period 
 
Similarly, the after-taxes-and-transfers Gini coefficient in period 2 (i.e. after the elections) equals 
the following:  
 
2 ,2 ,2( ) ( )p R R M R P P MG s s             
 
where δP, δM and δR denote the proportions of the three groups agents and sR,2 and sP,2 denotes the 
after taxes and transfers income shares of the rich and the poor in the second period.  
 
Since pre-electoral fiscal transfers are directed exclusively to the middle income group, the 
income shares of the poor and rich before and after elections remain unchanged (i.e. ,1 ,2R Rs s
and ,1 ,2P Ps s ). Consequently 1 2G G  and therefore increased fiscal transfers during the pre-
electoral period do not reduce income inequality (i.e. 
2 1 0G G G    ). 
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Proposition 2. The incumbent generates a rational political budget cycle. After election result is
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T  
 
and *
2r y . The pre-election result is 
* *
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1 1 1
P M
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(which is lower than  *
2r y  for any positive 
* *
1 1,
P MT T ) 
 
Proof. 
In period 2, the politician has no incentive to behave well. Therefore, he extracts the maximum 
amount of rents 
*
2r y , implying zero targeted transfers to all alternative groups of agents
* * *
2 2 2 0
P M RT T T   . 
 
In period 1, the incumbent decides optimally 1
PT , 1
MT , 1
RT and 
1r  by maximizing equation (21) 
subject to the government budget constraint in the first period (i.e.
 1 1 1 1
P M R
P M RT T T r y       ) 
and the rent extraction decision of the second period (i.e. 
*
2r y ). Equation (21) shows that  
1
RT  implies solely costs from the point of view of the incumbent. Therefore, in the absence of 
any cost benefit trade off, the optimal decision is *
1 0
RT  .  
 
Then, by taking the first order derivatives with respect to 1
PT  and 1
MT , we have: 
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for the optimal value of 
1
MT  (i.e. *1 1
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Moreover, we have:  *
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for the optimal value of 
1
PT  (i.e. *1 1
P PT T ) 
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Finally, from the government budget constraint in the first period (i.e.
 
1 1 1 1
P M R
P M RT T T r y       ), we take 
* * *
1 1 1
P M
P Mr y T T     which is lower than 
*
2r for positive 
values of 
*
1
MT or 
*
1
PT  
 
 
Corollary 2.  Every combination of 
*
1
MT and 
*
1
PT  that ensures 
*
1 0
PT   directs an amount of total 
transfers to the low-income group of agents and therefore reduces after-tax-and-transfers Gini 
coefficient. 
 
Proof. 
By definition, the after-taxes-and-transfers Gini coefficient in period 1 (i.e. before the elections) 
equals: 
 
1 ,1 ,1( ) ( )p R R M R P P MG s s            
 
where δP, δM and δR denote the proportions of the three groups agents and sR,1 and sP,1 denotes the 
after taxes and transfers income shares of the rich and the poor in the first period 
 
Similarly, the after-taxes-and-transfers Gini coefficient in period 2 (i.e. after the elections) equals 
the following:  
 
2 ,2 ,2( ) ( )p R R M R P P MG s s             
 
where δP, δM and δR denote the proportions of the three groups agents and sR,2 and sP,2 denotes the 
after-taxes-and-transfers income shares of the rich and the poor in the second period.  
 
It can be easily verified that, when 
*
1 0
PT  , we have ,1 ,2P Ps s  (i.e. the after-taxes-and-transfers 
income shares of the poor in period 1 is higher compared to the corresponding income shares in 
period 2) whereas the income shares of the rich before and after the elections remain unchanged 
(i.e. ,1 ,2R Rs s ). Consequently 1 2G G  and therefore increased fiscal transfers during the pre-
electoral period reduce income inequality (i.e. 
2 1 0G G G    ). 
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Appendix 2: List of countries 
Country 
Developed 
economy New democracy 
Years included in the sample (as New 
Democracy) 
Number of elections 
(as New Democracy) 
Argentina  √ 1987-2010 (1987-2003) 5 (4)  
Armenia  √ 1995-2008(1995-2008) 3(3) 
Australia √  1975-2010 13 
Austria √  1985-2010 8 
Bangladesh  √ 1992-2010 (1992-2010) 2(2) 
Belgium √  2001-2010 3 
Bolivia  √ 1991-2004 (1991-1997) 4(2) 
Brazil  √ 1987-2009 (1987-2002) 5(4) 
Bulgaria  √ 1993-2010 (1993-2006) 4 (3) 
Canada √  1975-2010 10 
Chile   √ 1990-2009 (1990-2009) 4(4) 
Colombia   1987-2009 5 
Costa Rica   1987-2009 5 
Czech Republic  √ 1995-2010(1995-2006) 5(4) 
Denmark √  1978-2010 11 
Dominican Rep.  √ 1988-2009(1988-1994) 6(2) 
Ecuador  √ 1989-2009(1989-1996) 6(2) 
El Salvador  √ 1987-2008 (1987-1994) 4(2) 
Estonia  √ 1997-2010(1997-2003) 3(2) 
Finland √  1975-2010 8 
France √  1975-2010 8 
Germany √  1991-2010 5 
Guatemala  √ 1987-2006(1987-1999) 5(4) 
Honduras  √ 1991-2010(1991-1993) 5(1) 
Hungary  √ 1991-2010(1991-2002) 5(3) 
India   1987-2005 6 
Indonesia  √ 1999-2010(1999-2010) 3(3) 
Ireland √  1982-2009 7 
Israel   1978-2005 8 
Italy √  1977-2010 9 
Japan √  1977-2010 11 
Korea √ √ 1987-2010(1987-2000) 6(4) 
Latvia  √ 1993-2010(1993-2002) 5(3) 
Lithuania  √ 1994-2010(1994-2010) 4(3) 
Luxemburg   2001-2010 2 
Malaysia   1989-2005 4 
Mexico  √ 1994-2010(1994-2010) 3(3) 
Moldova  √ 1993-2010(1993-2009) 5(4) 
Nepal  √ 1992-2002(1992-2002) 2(2) 
Netherlands √  1975-2010 11 
New Zealand √  1978-2007 9 
Norway √  1978-2010 8 
Panama  √ 1989-2010(1989-2004) 5(4) 
Paraguay  √ 1992-2010(1992-2000) 5(3) 
Peru  √ 1987-2010(1987-1995) 5(2) 
Philippines  √ 2002-2009(2002-2009) 1(1) 
Poland  √ 1990-2010(1990-2004) 4(3) 
Portugal √ √ 1982-2010(1982-1985) 9(2) 
Romania  √ 1992-2010(1992-2004) 5(4) 
Russia  √ 1994-2008(1994-2008) 4(4) 
Senegal  √ 2000-2006(2000-2006) 1(1) 
Slovak Rep.  √ 1994-2010(1995-2002) 5(4) 
Slovenia  √ 1992-2010(1994-2004) 5(4) 
South Africa   1987-2006 5 
Spain √ √ 1982-2010(1982-1986) 8(2) 
Sweden √  1977-2010 10 
Switzerland √  1982-2010 7 
Thailand   1987-2004 3 
Trinidad and Tobago   1987-2005 5 
Ukraine  √ 1994-2008(1994-2008) 3(3) 
United Kingdom √  1975-2010 8 
United States √  1975-2010 8 
Uruguay √ √ 1987-2010(1987-2004) 5(4) 
Venezuela   1987-2008 4 
Zambia  √ 1992-2005(1992-2005) 2(2) 
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Data Appendix: variable descriptions, descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
gini_market Gini coefficient of gross household 
market(pre-tax, pre-transfer)  
income 
1425 44.745 6.574 28.563 69.954 Solt (2009) , 
Standardized World 
Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) 
Δ gini_market Change in Gini coefficient of gross 
household income 
1425 0.127 1.316 -8.646 7.294 SWIID 
gini_net Gini coefficient of household 
disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) 
income 
1425 35.860 10.012 19.700 65.721 SWIID 
Δ gini_net Change in Gini coefficient of 
household disposable (post-tax, 
post-transfer) income 
1425 0.056 0.897 -5.685 5.452 SWIID 
redist Percentage reduction of Gini 
coefficient before and after the 
fiscal redistribution (i.e. before and 
after taxes and transfers) 
1425 20.105 16.814 -20.701 59.907 SWIID 
Δredist Change in percentage reduction of 
Gini coefficient before and after 
the fiscal redistribution (i.e. before 
and after taxes and transfers). 
1425 0.054 1.701 -12.390 12.756 SWIID 
elec Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 in the election year and 0 
otherwise. 
1425 0.255 0.436 0 1 Keefer (2012),  Database 
of Political Institutions 
(DPI) 
elec_new Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for elections held in new 
democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.077 0.267 0 1 DPI 
elec_old  Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for elections held in old 
democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.178 0.382 0 1 DPI 
elec_new_pred Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for predetermined 
elections held in new democracies 
and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.062 0.241 0 1 DPI 
elec_new_endog  Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for endogenous elections 
held in new democracies and 0 
otherwise. 
1425 0.015 0.123 0 1 DPI 
elec_old_pred Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for predetermined 
elections held in old democracies 
and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.124 0.329 0 1 DPI 
elec_old_endog  Dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 for endogenous elections 
held in old democraciesand 0 
otherwise. 
1425 0.055 0.228 0 1 DPI 
preel_new_pred Indicator variable that receives 
value (x/12) in the election year, 
with x the months before election, 
for predetermined elections held in 
new democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.037 0.160 0 1 DPI 
preel_new_endog  Indicator variable that receives 
value (x/12) in the election year, 
with x the months before election, 
for endogenous elections held in 
new democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.010 0.086 0 1 DPI 
preel_old_pred Indicator variable that receives 
value (x/12) in the election year, 
with x the months before election, 
for predetermined elections held in 
old democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.072 0.212 0 1 DPI 
preel_old_endog  Indicator variable that receives 
value (x/12) in the election year, 
with x the months before election, 
for endogenous elections held in 
old democracies and 0 otherwise. 
1425 0.034 0.156 0 1.083 DPI 
Liec Legislative index for electoral 
competitiveness.  
1425 6.974 0.191 6.000 7.000 DPI 
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Eiec Executive index for electoral 
competitiveness. 
1425 6.974 0.191 6.000 7.000 DPI 
gdppc  Real GDP per capita income 1425 16.986 12.500 0.736 80.231 Penn World Tables 8 
(PWT) 
Δgdppc Change in real GDP per capita 
income 
1425 0.333 0.657 -5.814 4.934 PWT 
gdppc^2  Real GDP per capita income 
squared 
1425 444.663 627.043 0.542 6437.068 PWT 
Δgdppc^2 Change in real GDP per capita 
income squared 
1425 15.279 49.568 -894.607 676.467 PWT 
hc Index of human capital per person  1425 2.710 0.455 1.404 3.619 PWT 
Δhc Change in index of human capital 
per person 
1425 0.017 0.015 -0.031 0.084 PWT 
dependency Population under the age of 14 as a 
share of total population (%) 
1425 56.139 12.017 37.589 97.765 World Bank 
Development indicators 
(WDI) online 
Δdependency Change in population under the 
age of 14 as a share of total 
population (%) 
1425 -0.454 0.559 -2.354 1.425 WDI online 
population 
density 
Population divided by land area in 
square kilometers (% ) 
1425 122.993 150.577 1.847 1160.990 WDI online 
population 
density 
Change in urban population  as a 
share of total population (% ) 
1425 1.035 2.304 -2.799 19.547 WDI online 
inflation Inflation  rate 1425 0.355 2.782 -0.235 68.369 WDI online 
Δinflation Change in inflation rate 1425 -0.058 2.949 -64.570 39.090 WDI online 
global KOF index of economic 
globalization 
1425 63.472 16.880 9.863 98.877 Dreher (2006) 
Δglobal Change in KOF index of economic 
globalization 
1425 0.841 2.284 -11.071 19.396 Dreher(2006) 
state repression Intensity of state repression 1142 1.114 3.111 0.000 31.600 Social, Political, and 
Economic Event 
Database (SPEED) 
Δ state 
repression 
Change in intensity of state 
repression 
1142 -0.148 3.305 -32.100 22.700 SPEED 
state violence Intensity of state violence 1142 2.793 14.858 0.000 313.200 SPEED 
Δ state violence Change in intensity of state 
violence 
1142 -0.067 16.878 -275.300 313.200 SPEED 
 
 
 
40 
References 
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Aidt, T. S., & Mooney, G. (2014). Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: evidence from 
the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937. Journal of Public Economics 112, 53-71. 
Albanesi, S. (2007). Inflation and inequality, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(4), 1088-1114. 
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly W. (2000). Redistributive Public Employment, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 48(2), 219-241. 
Alesina, A. & Wacziarg, R. (1998). Openness, country size and government. Journal of Public 
Economics, 69(3), 305-321. 
Amendola, A., Easaw J., & Savoia, A. (2013). Inequality in developing economies: the role of 
institutional development, Public Choice, 155(1), 43-60. 
Anderson, W., & Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel 
data, Journal of Econometrics, 18(1), 47-82. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 
277-297.  
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010, 
Journal of Development Economics, 104, 184-198. 
Block, S. (2002). Elections, electoral competitiveness, and political budget cycles in developing 
countries. Harvard University CID Working Paper No. 78. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models, Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. 
Brender, A., & Drazen A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295. 
Brender, A., & Drazen A. (2007). Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? 
Affecting Attitudes. NBER Working Paper No. 13457 
Brender, A. & Drazen A. (2008). How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection 
prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries. American Economic Review, 98(5), 
2203-2220.  
Brender, A., & Drazen A. (2009). Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes, and 
Clientelism. American Economic Review, 99(2), 304-309. 
Bruno, G. (2005). Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic unbalanced panel 
data models, Economics Letters, 87(3), 361-366. 
Choi, I. (2001). Unit root tests for panel data, Journal of International Money and Finance, 
20(2), 249-272.  
Chong, A., Gradstein, M., & Calderon, C. (2009). Can foreign aid reduce income inequality and 
poverty? Public Choice, 140(1), 59-84. 
Drazen, A., Elsava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and 
evidence, Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52.  
Dreher, A. (2006). Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a New Index. 
Applied Economics, 38(10), 1091–1110. 
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of 
political pressures. Public Choice, 153, 295–327. 
Fearon, J. (2011). Self-Enforcing Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(4), 1661-
1708. 
41 
Franzese, R. J. (2000). Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt in developed 
democracies, 1956-1990. In Strauch, R., & Jürgen von Hagen (Eds.), Institutions, politics 
and fiscal policy (pp. 61-83). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press. 
Galasso, V., & Profeta, P. (2004). Lessons for an Aging Society: the Political Sustainability of 
Social Security Systems. Economic Policy, 19(38),  63-115. 
Heckelman, J. C. and Berument, H. (1998). Political business cycles and endogenous elections. 
Southern Economic Journal, 64(4), 987–1000. 
Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science 
Review, 71(4), 467-487. 
Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Dıez-Medrano, J., Halman, L., & Luijkx, R. (2004). Human beliefs 
and values. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Katsimi M. & Sarantides V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in 
developed, established democracies, Public Choice, 151(1), 325-362. 
Keefer, P. (2012). Database on Political Institutions: changes and variable definitions, The World 
Bank. 
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: Effect of elections in the Indian 
states, Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. 
Kiviet, J. F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 53-78. 
Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013a). Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence, 
Public Choice, 157(3-4), 387-410. 
Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013b). Do political budget cycles really exist?, Applied Economics, 
45(3), 329-341. 
Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2013c). Political budget cycles and election outcomes. Public Choice, 
157(1), 245-267. 
Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2013d). Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data 
analysis, Economics Letters, 120(3), 516-520. 
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality, American Economic Review, 45(1), 
1-28. 
Li, H., Squire, L., & Zou, H.-F. (1998). Explaining international and intertemporal variations in 
income inequality. Economic Journal, 108(446), 26-43. 
Linz, J., & Stepan A. (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Little, A., (2012). Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution. 
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 7(3), 249-283. 
Little, A., Tucker, J., & LaGatta, T. (2014). Election, Protest and alternation of power. Mimeo 
Lohman, S. (1998). Rationalizing the political business cycle: a workhorse model, Economics 
and Politics, 10(1), 1–17. 
Marshall, M., & Jaggers, K. (2010). Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace. Available 
from: www.systemicpeace.org. 
Maddala, S., & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and new 
simple test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61(S1), 631-652. 
Mechtel M., & Potrafke, N. (2013). Electoral cycles in active labor market policies, Public 
Choice, 156(1), 181-194. 
42 
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., Perotti, R., & Massimo, R. (2002). Electoral systems and public spending. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2), 609-657. 
Nardulli, P., Leetaru, K. & Hayes, M. (2011). Event Data, Civil Unrest and the Social, Political 
and Economic Event Database (SPEED) Project: Post World War II Trends in Political 
Protests and Violence. Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Quebec.  
Ng, S., &  Perron, P. (2001). Lag Length Selection and the Construction of Unit Root Tests with 
Good Size and Power. Econometrica,  69 (6), 1519-54. 
Nickell, S. J. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 49(6), 1417-
1426. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-
190. 
Persson, T., & Tabellini G. (2000). Political Economics. Explaining Economic 
Policy.Cambridge: MIT Press 
Persson, T., & Tabellini G. (2003). The economic effect of constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Potrafke, N. (2011). Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical 
evidence from OECD countries, Economics of Governance, 12(2), 101-134. 
Psacharopoulos, G. (1994). Returns to investment in education: A global update, World 
Development, 22(9), 1325-1343.  
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone to far? Washington D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics.  
Rodrik, D. (1998). Do more open economies have bigger governments? The Journal of Political 
Economy, 106(5), 997-1032. 
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-
36. 
Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political business cycles and fiscal policies in developing countries. 
Kyklos, 49(2), 155-170.  
Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. 
Public Choice, 102(1–2), 115–130. 
Shi, M., & Svensson J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? 
Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. 
Solt, F. (2009). Standardizing the world income inequality database. Social Science Quarterly 
90(2), 231-242. 
Streb, J., Lema, D., & Torrens, G. (2009). Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: 
Cross Country Evidence, Kyklos, 62(3), 425-46. 
Streb, J. M., & Torrens, G. (2013). Making rules credible: divided government and political 
budget cycles. Public Choice, 156(3-4), 703-722. 
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing 
countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77. 
von Weizsäcker R. (1996). Distributive implications of an aging society, European Economic 
Review, 40(3-5), 729-746. 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 1. Panel Unit root tests (H0: unit root) 
Variables 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square ADF-Choi Z-stat 
Constant Constant and  
Trend 
Constant Constant and  
Trend 
gini_market      133.175  
 (0.466) 
137.971  
(0.295) 
 -0.421 
(0.337) 
2.900 
(0.998) 
     
Δgini_market 299.675*** 
(0.000) 
255.789*** 
(0.000) 
-8.003*** 
(0.000) 
-4.78820*** 
(0.000) 
     
gini_net 115.371 
(0.816) 
105.982 
(0.939) 
0.932 
(0.824) 
4.632 
(1.000) 
     
Δgini_net  366.506*** 
(0.000) 
292.940*** 
(0.000) 
-9.867*** 
(0.000) 
-6.56651**) 
(0.000) 
     
redist 201.205*** 
(0.000) 
163.277** 
(0.025) 
-3.068*** 
(0.002) 
-0.039  
(0.484) 
     
Δredist  395.318*** 
(0.000) 
259.854*** 
(0.000) 
-10.767*** 
(0.000) 
-4.733*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: The “Δ” prefix of a variable indicates that the first differences were taken. Figures without parenthesis are test statistics and those inside parentheses are respective probabilities. *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. The choice of the lag length was made on the basis of the Modified Akaike Information Criterion 
(Ng and Perron (2001)) with a maximum lag length equal to 2. 
44 
Table 2. Elections and fiscal redistribution: basic findings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec -0.038 -0.088* 0.132 - - - - - - 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.09)       
          
elec_ new  - - - -0.020 -0.247*** 0.631** - - - 
    (0.13) (0.09) (0.26)    
          
elec_old - - - -0.046 -0.018 -0.088 - - - 
    (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)    
          
elec_new_pred - - - - - - 0.049 -0.268*** 0.853*** 
       (0.12) (0.10) (0.30) 
          
elec_new_endog - - - - - - -0.281 -0.164 -0.204 
       (0.34) (0.24) (0.36) 
          
elec_old_pred - - - - - - -0.035 -0.015 -0.025 
       (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) 
          
elec_old_endog - - - - - - -0.071 -0.024 -0.230 
       (0.18) (0.08) (0.25) 
          
ΔYt-1 0.220** 0.191** 0.179** 0.220** 0.194** 0.180*** 0.222*** 0.192** 0.183*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
          
Δgdppc 0.149 0.036 0.166 0.149 0.034 0.177 0.143 0.035 0.154 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) 
          
Δgdppc^2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          
Δhc -0.006 -2.182 2.773 -0.001 -2.221 2.906 0.003 -2.220 2.947 
 (2.57) (2.03) (2.50) (2.57) (2.05) (2.51) (2.58) (2.05) (2.53) 
          
Δdependency 0.128 0.069 0.075 0.128 0.068 0.077 0.127 0.068 0.074 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) 
          
Δpopulation_density 0.047* 0.006 0.075*** 0.046* 0.008 0.070*** 0.045* 0.008 0.066*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
          
Δinflation 0.019 0.025* -0.018 0.019 0.026* -0.020 0.018 0.026* -0.023 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
          
Δglobal 0.029 0.027** -0.012 0.029 0.027** -0.011 0.029 0.027** -0.011 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
R2 0.131 0.132 0.086 0.131 0.135 0.094 0.132 0.135 0.099 
N 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 
Avg. time series 
length 
21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 
Notes: The “Δ” prefix of a variable indicates that the first differences were taken. All regressions include time and regional fixed effects.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes 
significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Elections and fiscal redistribution: Developed vs. Developing countries  
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec_new_pred -0.790** -0.734* 0.051 0.087 -0.244** 0.873*** 
 (0.33) (0.38) (1.79) (0.11) (0.10) (0.29) 
       
elec_new_endog -0.332 -0.159 -0.198 -0.213 -0.175 -0.152 
 (0.26) (0.15) (0.40) (0.34) (0.24) (0.44) 
       
elec_old_pred -0.019 0.000 -0.031 -0.024 0.028 -0.039 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.18) 
       
elec_old_endog 0.010 0.038 -0.257 -0.184 -0.145 -0.123 
 (0.23) (0.09) (0.33) (0.27) (0.17) (0.36) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.339*** 0.352*** 0.254*** 0.138 0.129 0.154 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
       
Δgdppc 0.116 -0.018 0.218 0.449* 0.226 0.229 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.24) (0.25) (0.40) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.012* -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δhc 2.732 0.839 4.497 -2.918 -5.157 1.719 
 (3.02) (1.29) (4.26) (3.96) (3.36) (3.62) 
       
Δdependency 0.144 0.016 0.152 0.070 0.049 0.046 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) 
       
Δpopulation_density 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.067*** 0.014 0.089*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Δinflation 0.541 0.487 -0.529 0.018 0.027** -0.027 
 (2.87) (1.80) (1.64) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
Δglobal 0.036 0.046* -0.075** 0.027 0.022 0.002 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
R2 0.191 0.193 0.145 0.146 0.167 0.101 
N 637 637 637 784 784 784 
Avg. time series length 28.9 28.9 28.9 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Notes: set Table 2 
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Table 4. Elections and fiscal redistribution: New vs. Old democracies in Developed and Developing countries  
 Old Democracies Developed economies, Old Democracies Developing economies, Old Democracies New democracies Developing Economies new democracies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec_pred -0.003 -0.003 -0.013 -0.023 -0.008 -0.023 0.020 0.007 0.006 0.045 -0.232 0.822** 0.094 -0.205 0.908*** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.16) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.33) (0.21) (0.16) (0.34) 
                
elec_endog -0.016 0.010 -0.193 0.007 0.042 -0.281 -0.138 -0.081 -0.163 -0.324 -0.237 -0.326 -0.361 -0.278 -0.314 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (0.33) (0.37) (0.27) (0.59) (0.42) (0.31) (0.65) 
                
ΔYt-1 0.384*** 0.344*** 0.359*** 0.383*** 0.379*** 0.299*** 0.258*** 0.219*** 0.460*** -0.044 0.003 0.043 -0.043 -0.004 0.066 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
                
Δgdppc 0.024 -0.036 0.117 0.036 -0.082 0.216 0.616* 0.250 0.611 0.186 0.342 -0.258 0.412 0.420 0.086 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.21) (0.12) (0.24) (0.36) (0.30) (0.45) (0.63) (0.47) (1.01) (0.64) (0.47) (1.02) 
                
Δgdppc^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.016 -0.006 -0.018 -0.012 -0.016 0.006 -0.030 -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
                
Δhc 0.335 -1.123 3.239 3.165 0.835 6.507 -3.357 -5.066 1.260 -5.807 2.232 -15.572 -6.560 3.840 -21.418 
 (0.61) (2.15) (3.94) (4.42) (2.44) (5.11) (4.95) (4.05) (6.26) (8.37) (6.18) (13.28) (9.92) (7.30) (15.78) 
                
Δdependency -0.024 -0.019 -0.082 0.054 -0.018 0.055 -0.184 -0.040 -0.174 0.582** 0.616*** -0.163 0.573* 0.638*** -0.241 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.17) (0.09) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21) (0.45) (0.30) (0.22) (0.47) 
                
Δpopulation_density 0.019 -0.006 0.059 0.025 -0.005 0.077 0.061 -0.004 0.092 -0.509*** 0.066 -0.868*** -0.490*** 0.090 -0.843*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.19) (0.14) (0.30) (0.18) (0.13) (0.29) 
                
Δinflation -0.048 0.038 -0.097 1.584 1.156 -0.326 0.228 0.266 -0.051 0.008 0.018 -0.025 0.007 0.017 -0.029 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.35) (2.53) (1.40) (2.92) (0.53) (0.43) (0.66) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
                
Δglobal 0.036 0.036** -0.023 0.049 0.054** -0.067 0.030 0.023 0.001 -0.010 0.000 -0.012 -0.005 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
N 973 973 973 604 604 604 368 368 368 440 440 440 412 412 412 
Avg. time series 
length 
18.2 18.2 18.2 29.5 29.5 29.5 10.9 10.9 10.9 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Notes: The “Δ” prefix of a variable indicates that the first differences were taken. LSDVc estimator using Arellano-Bond (1991) for initial bias correction. All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors 
bootstrapped with 200 replications, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 5. Elections and fiscal redistribution: Alternative timing of elections 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
preel_new_pred -1.696 -2.264** 2.180 0.113 -0.320** 1.181*** 
 (1.14) (0.98) (5.57) (0.18) (0.15) (0.46) 
       
preel_new_endog -0.398 -0.232 -0.077 -0.382 -0.239 -0.348 
 (0.39) (0.21) (0.51) (0.34) (0.26) (0.52) 
       
preel_old_pred 0.051 0.028 0.044 -0.014 0.019 -0.053 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) 
       
preel_old_endog -0.058 0.144 -0.621 -0.348 -0.155 -0.527 
 (0.29) (0.14) (0.37) (0.46) (0.26) (0.57) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.338*** 0.353*** 0.250*** 0.137 0.128 0.151 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
       
Δgdppc 0.110 -0.018 0.208 0.451* 0.223 0.245 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.25) (0.25) (0.41) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.012* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δhc 2.687 0.841 4.366 -2.954 -5.159 1.642 
 (3.07) (1.30) (4.25) (3.94) (3.38) (3.61) 
       
Δdependency 0.147 0.014 0.169 0.068 0.054 0.027 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) 
       
Δpopulation_density -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.067*** 0.014 0.088*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Δinflation 0.574 0.555 -0.611 0.019 0.026* -0.025 
 (2.87) (1.78) (1.59) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
Δglobal 0.036 0.046* -0.074** 0.027 0.023 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
R2 0.190 0.196 0.151 0.147 0.166 0.099 
N 637 637 637 784 784 784 
Avg. time series length 28.9 28.9 28.9 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Notes: set Table 2 
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Table 6. Elections and fiscal redistribution: Excluding outlier observations 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec_new_pred -0.615** -1.018*** -0.314 0.115 -0.073 0.408** 
 (0.26) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.07) (0.20) 
       
elec_new_endog -0.158 -0.181 0.255 -0.131 -0.022 -0.251 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.19) (0.16) (0.25) 
       
elec_old_pred -0.068 -0.005 0.084 0.009 0.080 -0.037 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
       
elec_old_endog -0.002 0.022 -0.144 -0.021 -0.153 -0.011 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.422*** 0.372*** 0.371*** 0.261*** 0.294*** 0.239*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
       
Δgdppc 0.036 -0.056 0.169 0.172 0.049 0.294 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
       
Δhc 2.132 1.514 1.195 -3.146 -1.811 2.083 
 (2.67) (1.39) (2.48) (3.30) (1.95) (2.88) 
       
Δdependency 0.084 -0.003 0.132 -0.015 0.095 0.139 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) 
       
Δpopulation_density 0.016 0.003 0.021 -0.009 0.013 0.058*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
Δinflation 0.842 0.305 -0.810 0.002 0.014 -0.011 
 (2.45) (1.18) (1.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δglobal 0.009 0.023 -0.055* 0.020 0.011 0.024 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
R2 0.327 0.284 0.284 0.246 0.267 0.173 
N 605 599 606 747 744 744 
Avg. time series length 27.5 27.2 27.5 17.4 17.3 17.3 
Notes: set Table 2 
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Table 7. Elections and fiscal redistribution: Excluding 10% of obs. with the higher uncertainty 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec_new_pred -1.149*** -0.711* -1.323*** -0.014 -0.245* 0.656*** 
 (0.17) (0.39) (0.27) (0.14) (0.13) (0.24) 
       
elec_new_endog -0.361 -0.163 -0.129 -0.444 0.083 -0.487 
 (0.37) (0.16) (0.42) (0.36) (0.20) (0.39) 
       
elec_old_pred 0.007 -0.014 0.028 -0.081 -0.050 -0.129 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.15) 
       
elec_old_endog 0.021 0.095 -0.206 0.099 -0.147 0.131 
 (0.27) (0.07) (0.35) (0.24) (0.16) (0.42) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.323*** 0.353*** 0.269*** 0.181* 0.245** 0.175 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
       
Δgdppc 0.057 0.014 0.261* 0.487** 0.022 0.274 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.23) (0.23) (0.43) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.012* -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δhc 2.757 1.041 5.390 -5.022 -2.108 -0.095 
 (2.92) (1.19) (4.87) (4.95) (2.10) (4.15) 
       
Δdependency 0.088 0.016 0.175 -0.008 0.023 0.128 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.17) 
       
Δpopulation_density 0.014 0.004 0.052* 0.050** 0.006 0.056 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
       
Δinflation 1.187 0.708 -0.898 0.028 0.024** -0.010 
 (2.61) (1.86) (1.78) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δglobal -0.004 0.051* -0.076* 0.014 0.018 -0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
R2 0.192 0.202 0.169 0.176 0.219 0.113 
N 574 574 574 706 706 706 
Avg. time series length 26.1 26.1 26.1 16.4 16.4 16.4 
Notes: set Table 2 
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Table 8. Elections and fiscal redistribution: Excluding ex-Soviet Union countries 
 All countries: excluding transition economies Developing countries: excluding transition 
economies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist Δgini_market Δgini_net Δredist 
elec_new_pred 0.068 -0.210* 0.817** 0.146 -0.165 0.845** 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.36) (0.14) (0.11) (0.36) 
       
elec_new_endog 0.049 0.198 -0.479 0.062 0.197 -0.503 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.31) (0.20) (0.20) (0.40) 
       
elec_old_pred -0.018 0.004 -0.044 -0.019 0.043 -0.114 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.18) 
       
elec_old_endog -0.027 0.000 -0.192 -0.147 -0.102 -0.034 
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.25) (0.23) (0.14) (0.34) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.223*** 0.364*** 0.348*** 0.207* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) 
       
Δgdppc 0.101 -0.005 0.199 0.351 0.035 0.539 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.27) (0.51) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.009 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δhc -0.367 -2.236 3.196 -3.342 -5.293* 2.072 
 (2.31) (1.75) (2.43) (3.24) (2.88) (3.19) 
       
Δdependency 0.049 0.013 0.050 -0.055 -0.036 -0.015 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) 
       
Δpopulation_density 0.039* 0.008 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.012 0.081*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Δinflation 0.009 0.009** -0.002 0.011 0.012** -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
Δglobal 0.008 0.017 -0.034 -0.001 0.009 -0.025 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
R2 0.205 0.217 0.129 0.275 0.276 0.147 
N 1310 1310 1310 673 673 673 
Avg. time series length 22.6 22.6 22.6 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Notes: set Table 2 
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Table 9. Elections, fiscal redistribution and political instability 
Instability measure: State repression  State Violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Δredist Δredist Δredist Δredist Δredist Δredist 
elec_new_pred 0.993*** 0.076 1.026*** 0.998*** 0.124 1.033*** 
 (0.34) (1.94) (0.33) (0.35) (2.11) (0.34) 
       
elec_new_endog 0.136 -0.567 0.298 0.099 -0.565 0.176 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.48) (0.38) (0.44) (0.46) 
       
elec_old_pred 0.053 -0.023 0.166 0.046 -0.001 0.142 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) 
       
elec_old_endog -0.155 -0.260 0.267 -0.078 -0.108 0.205 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.46) (0.24) (0.25) (0.45) 
       
elec_new_pred*Δinstability 0.011 0.056 -0.001 0.008*** 0.055 0.008** 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) 
       
elec_new_endog*Δinstability 0.148** 0.303 0.174* 0.060 -0.120 0.059 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) 
       
elec_old_pred*Δinstability -0.071* -0.085 -0.065 0.013*** -0.099 0.018*** 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) 
       
elec_old_endog*Δinstability -0.036 -0.168 0.000 0.057 0.242 -0.006 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.07) (0.26) (0.02) 
       
Δinstability measure 0.013 -0.013 0.013 -0.002* -0.028 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
       
ΔYt-1 0.180** 0.254*** 0.152 0.178** 0.229*** 0.149 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) 
       
Δgdppc 0.229 0.261 0.040 0.269 0.278 0.142 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.49) (0.18) (0.19) (0.46) 
       
Δgdppc^2 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
       
Δhc 1.957 4.490 0.048 2.636 5.865 0.224 
 (2.69) (4.54) (3.57) (3.00) (5.60) (3.53) 
       
Δdependency 0.113 0.167 0.090 0.113 0.179 0.084 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) 
       
Δpopulation_density 0.084*** 0.031 0.103*** 0.086*** 0.030 0.104*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
       
Δinflation -0.025 0.992 -0.030 -0.022 1.025 -0.026 
 (0.02) (2.50) (0.02) (0.02) (2.66) (0.02) 
       
Δglobal -0.033 -0.090** -0.023 -0.032 -0.104** -0.023 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
R2 0.106 0.154 0.110 0.107 0.165 0.110 
N 1134 504 630 1134 504 630 
Avg. time series length 18.3 24.0 15.4 18.3 24.0 15.4 
Notes: set Table 2 
 
